This paper develops a positive theory of two-way capital flows-the outward flight of productive capital, and inward foreign direct investment that acquires ownership of local production units. The model exploits insights from decision-making under uncertainty, and traces out how entrepreneurial incentive to engage in risky production impacts equilibrium returns on capital. Contrary to expectation, productive assets tend to flow from capital-poor to capital-rich economies, while foreign direct investment follows the reversed pattern. By examining the nature of optimal interventions, the paper also demonstrates the inherent conflict of interests between host and source countries engaged in capital market liberalization. D 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Developing countries experiencing massive flights of domestic capital and productive assets abroad are nevertheless frequently major recipients of foreign direct investment. The two faces of this phenomenon of two-way capital flows involve (i) the flight of relatively liquid capital and productive assets that could have contributed to indigenous economic growth, and (ii) the inflow of foreign direct investment that shifts the benefits of ownership of local production units onto the hands of foreign entrepreneurs. Each of these challenges facing emerging economies has been studied extensively, but separately, in the capital flight and foreign direct investment literature 1 . As inter-related and simultaneous phenomena, however, the root causes of two-way capital flows, and their implications in terms of the welfare of host and origin countries, have nevertheless received very little theoretical attention.
Yet, there are good reasons to believe that the coexistence of capital flight and foreign direct investment in the reverse direction is not simply a matter of theoretical curiosity. We take thirty-seven countries under the two regional groupings of Latin American and the Caribbean 2 , and East Asia and Pacific 3 from 1989 to 1999 as cases in point. Members of both sets of countries underwent substantial capital market liberalization throughout the 1990s, as can be seen from the more than many-fold increase in inward foreign direct investment on a per capita basis (Table 1 ). The size of foreign direct investment is defined here as net inflows of investment that acquire a lasting management interest in local enterprises (10% or more of voting stock) 4 .
2 Estimates are computed based on World Development Indicators (2001). Countries and time period available under the regional grouping of Latin America are: Argentina (1989 Argentina ( -1999 , Barbados (1989 -1999 ), Brazil (1989 -1999 , Bolivia (1989 Bolivia ( -1999 , Chile (1989 Chile ( -1999 , Colombia (1989 -1999 ), Costa Rica (1989 -1999 ), Dominican Republic (1989 -1996 , Ecuador (1989 -1992 ), El Salvador (1989 -1999 , Grenada (1989 Grenada ( -1996 , Guatemala (1989 Guatemala ( -1994 , Haiti (1989 Haiti ( -1991 , Honduras (1989 Honduras ( -1999 , Jamaica (1989 Jamaica ( -1999 , Mexico (1989 Mexico ( -1993 , Paraguay (1989 Paraguay ( -1999 , Panama (1998 -1999 ), Peru (1995 -1998 ), St. Lucia (1989 -1996 , St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1989 Grenadines ( -1996 , Trinidad and Tobago (1989-1994) , Uruguay (1989 -1998 ), Venezuela, RB (1989 -1999 .
3 Countries and time period available under the regional grouping of East Asia and Pacific are: China (1989 -1999 ), Fiji (1989 -1999 ), Indonesia (1989 -1999 , Lao PDR (1990 -1999 , Malaysia (1989 Malaysia ( -1999 , Mongolia (1993 -1999 ), Papua New Guinea (1989 -1999 , Philippines (1989 -1999 ), Solomon Islands (1989 -1999 , Thailand (1989 Thailand ( -1999 , Tonga (1989 Tonga ( -1993 , Vanuatu (1989 Vanuatu ( -1995 , Vietnam (1993 Vietnam ( -1998 . 
